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The EU has committed itself to meet an 8% greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction target 
level following the Kyoto agreement. Therefore, the EU Commission has just 
proposed a new directive establishing a framework for GHG emissions trading within 
the European Union. This proposal is the outcome of a policy process started by the 
EU Commission and its Green Paper from March 2000. The main industrial 
stakeholders all had the opportunity to comment on the Green Paper and from their 
positions we will analyse how far they are winners or losers compared to the final 
directive proposal. Here, we find that the dominant interest groups indeed influenced 
the final design of an EU GHG market. This industrial rent-seeking most prominently 
lead to a grandfathered permit allocation rule like the one found in the US tradable 
permit systems. 
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  1 1: Introduction 
 
The European energy sector has for some time been facing the dual challenge of 
opening markets and tightening of environmental controls – especially with regard to 
CO2 emissions. This dual challenge demands new approaches from all actors both 
energy companies and legislators. The traditional command and control regulation is 
not adequate for the new market conditions. For a while, a common European CO2 tax 
seemed to be the solution, but it proved impossible to implement this new tax. Thus, 
tradable greenhouse gas (GHG) permits, in particular with relation to CO2 emissions, 
are an interesting alternative to consider when addressing the new situation, CEU 
(2000). Tradable permits have successfully been implemented in the United States to 
reduce SO2 emissions (Svendsen, 1998;1999). 
 
The prerequisite for the development of effective GHG trade models, which have a 
chance of being implemented, is to understand the political economy of the EU. This 
topic has not been treated satisfactorily in the public choice literature yet. Two books 
have so far tried to look at EU lobbyism in general within a political economy setting, 
namely Greenwood and Aspinwall (1998) and Mazey and Richardson (1993). 
However, no literature has so far analyzed the political economy of a tradable CO2 
permit market in the European Union. 
 
This is important because any environmental policy has to pass through a political 
decision process. If the policy is not designed in a politically acceptable way, the 
original proposal will be changed beyond recognition and away from its cost-effective 
design during the political decision-making process, Daugbjerg and Svendsen (2001) 
and Svendsen (1998). Thus, the intention of this paper is to try to analyse the possible 
ways in which the effective design of a tradable CO2 permit market can be affected by 
the interactions between private corporations and the Institutions of the European 
Community. The underlying assumption is that actors’ interaction are guided by 
considerations of self-interest in that they attempt to achieve their goals, such as 
maximising their resources, in a specific context of institutional rules (Héritier, 2000). 
 
  2 The main case here is the EU efforts to meet the 8% GHG reduction Kyoto target 
level. Here, the EU Commission has just proposed a new directive establishing a 
framework for greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union (CEU, 
2001). The proposal for a GHG-directive is the outcome of a policy process started by 
the EU-Commission in March 2000 with the Green Paper on greenhouse emissions 
trading within the European Union (CEU, 2000). The stakeholders all had the 
opportunity to comment on the Green Paper and from their positions we will analyse 
how far they are winners or losers compared to the proposal. 
 
The policy process from a Green Paper to a proposal is indeed influenced by the 
private stakeholders (Haites and Mullins, 2001), although the influence is through or 
in competition with the other General Directorates. The European Parliament and the 
national governments dominate the policy process when the directive is proposed. In 
this later part of the process, which has just begun, the private stakeholders must to a 
higher degree go through the politicians in the EU-parliament or the national 
parliament and government. 
 
We deal with the actors mentioned in the green paper as the most preferred 
participants. The Commission is more open to listen to the opinion from stakeholders 
they want to regulate. The most preferred participants are the electricity and heat 
sector, the iron and steel sector, refining, chemicals, building materials 
(glass/pottery/cement) and paper/pulp/printing.  
 
We focus on the industrial groupings as environmental organizations and consumer 
organizations tend to be weak and without much lobbying power in the political 
arena. Compared to the size and budget of industrial interest groups, the 
environmental interest groups are only of minor importance in relation to EU policy 
making (Michaelowa, 1998). This suggestion is confirmed by the empirical results in 
Daubjerg and Svendsen (2001). 
 
Thus our main question is: Can the final GHG directive design proposal be explained 
by potential industrial winners and losers involved in the policy making process? 
 
  3 We attempt to answer this main question in the following way. First, Section 2 
describes the change in design from the Green Paper to the final directive proposal. 
Then, Section 3 analyses the political positions of the dominant industrial interest 
groups. Identifying winners and losers in the political process may help explain any 
change in design. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
In spite of the fact that our discussions on political formations and interests and 
resulting policy recommendations are second best in strict economic terms, they are 
the best economic designs given that they must be politically feasible. So, if we can 
answer the main question, it leads to a better understanding of how an effective design 
proposal of a tradable permit market should be designed to stand a chance of being 
implemented as well. 
 
 
2: Green Paper and final directive proposal. 
 
To describe the possible change in design, we use the overall structure in the green 
paper to plot in the positions of dominant industrial interest groups. The 10 questions 
in the Green Paper are divided in four main groups. The first four questions concern 
the target group. Questions 5 and 6 are about allocation of permits. Questions 7 and 8 
addresses emissions trading and the potential mix with other instruments. Finally, 
questions 9 and 10 cover the compliance issue. The difference between the original 
Green Paper proposal (before lobbyism) and the final directive proposal (after 
lobbyism) is shown in detail in Table 1 below.  
 
Overall, the main changes from the Green paper to the final proposal are the 
following. First, the target group has been limited to include emissions of CO2 from a 
specific number of sectors specified on the community level. The regulation is 
mandatory and starts in 2005. The sectors included are combustion installations above 
20 MW instead of 50 MW, coke ovens, refineries, production and processing of 
ferrous metals, mineral industry (building materials), and other activities such as 
paper and pulp. The chemistry is the only sector excluded compared to the green 
  4 paper, further are combustion of hazardous and municipal waste and the emissions 
from demonstration and research projects excluded. The sectors included in the target 
group emit roughly half of total CO2 emissions in the EU whereas the electricity and 
heat industry alone emits one-third (CEU, 2000a). 
 
On the second issue of allocation, the Green Paper lists a number of possibilities such 
as auctioning-off permits to the highest bidding parties. The final choice in the 
directive proposal is allocation free of charge in the form of grandfathering based on 
benchmarking or a historic baseline, which is clearly the solution that benefits 
industry the most in general. This rule of grandfathering and free initial allocation 
minimizes private reduction costs to industry and creates a (financial) barrier to entry 
in relation to new market entrants as they have to buy all their needed permits from 
existing firms (see Tietenberg 1985; Svendsen 1998; Daugbjerg and Svendsen 2001). 
The quantities allocated are decided on the national level taking the burden sharing 
agreement into account.  
 
The third issue of mix with other instruments is not finally settled yet. Emissions 
trading is supposed to be complementary to taxes. Project based emissions and links 
to other trading systems are held out until the international rules are settled. More 
uncertain is how emission trading should be mixed with e.g. negotiated agreements 
and renewable certificates.  
 
Finally, the fourth issue of compliance is consistent with the original Green Paper 
proposal. Only difference is that the actual penalty size and banking periods have 
been spelled out in detail. Especially is early action taking into consideration by 
leaving it up to the member state whether permits from the first period can be carried 












  5 Table 1: Comparison of Green Paper and final directive proposal.  
  Green paper   Final directive proposal  
When   2005   2005  
1. Target group 
 
Inclusion of all 6 gases from electricity/heat (50 MW), 
iron and steel,, refining, chemicals, glass/pottery/ 
cement and paper/pulp/printing.  
 
Three possible ways to include sectors 
A common community program?   
A co-ordinated program: 
1. Opt-in?  
2. Opt out?  
 
Enlargement of the EU? 
Only CO2 from energy combustion installations 
exceeding 20 MW, coke ovens, refineries, production 
and processing of iron and steel building materials 
(cement, pottery , glass), and  paper and pulp.  
 
Community decides the sectors to include and as a 
general rule no opt-in or opt-out possibilities 
 
Enlargement: New MS part of the system, if they enter 
before program comes into force. Otherwise mutual 
recognition. 
 
2. Initial allocation  1. MS define quantity ? 
2. Allocation to companies by MS?  
3. Allocation by grandfathering or auction?   
 
1. MS makes initial allocation taking into account the 
burden sharing agreement. 
2/3. Directive establishes a common method in the form 
of grandfathering in the first period 
 





Is emissions trading supplementary or complementary? 
 
 
Environmental agreements: Go well together with 
emissions trading 
 
Energy taxation: complementary instruments for 
covering the totality of emissions. 
 
Community regulation: amendment of IPPC is necessary  
 
Links to other programs: mutual recognition.  
 
Links to renewable certificates: Certificates regulate the 
additional benefit from RE. MS take account of 
renewable energy targets, state aid question.  
4. Compliance  Size of penalty? 
 
Compliance at company level or at MS level ? 
Penalty in the first period is 50 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
second. 
 
MS shall determine sanctions for other breaches of the 
directive.  
 
Banking during periods but MS decide whether banking 
from the first period from 2005-2007 to the second 
period is allowed.  
Source: The authors. 
 
Note on abbreviations:  IPPC: Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (EU-directive), MS: 





3: Industrial interest groups 
 
We will try to identify actual losers and winners when comparing the Green Paper 
proposal and the final directive proposal. The positions stated are all drawn from 
hearings on the Green Paper (DG Environment, 2000). When we refer to a position of 
a stakeholder, the Green Paper hearing is the source. Otherwise, the source is 
mentioned.  
 
  6 We will focus on the dominant industrial lobbying organisations representing the 
largest emitters. Generally speaking, lobbies representing large emitters will try to 
keep costs as low as possible or even gain additional rents. This means they favour 
subsidies such as grandfathering, preferably with an emissions target that responds to 
organic growth of the company in a flexible way. Otherwise, voluntary agreements 
are the favoured instrument. Voluntary agreements are always hard to assess because 
it is close to impossible to know what would have happened to the level of emissions 
if the agreement had not entered into force (the baseline level of emissions is 
counterfactual). For the same reason, (Michaelowa, 1998) suggest that voluntary 
agreements allow labelling the autonomous rise in energy efficiency through cost-
saving innovation as climate-policy-induced activity (?).  
 
The reference for the evaluation of the sectors is the proposed directive and purpose 
of the following analysis is to state whether a sector according to their hearing answer 
is a winner or a loser. Here, we define ‘winners’ as actors that influence the frames 
and the scope of the market in their favour thus achieving a net gain from rent-
seeking. This approach is in line with the theoretical framework of Tullock (1967) and 
Olson (1965). Related to our four groupings the actors will argue for a voluntary 
program in the target group. If the sector is a seller they will find it attractive to be a 
part of the program. If they see them selves as a buyer they might be better off with 
domestic regulation in the form of negotiated agreements or standard regulation. On 
allocation, the free allocation of permits (‘grandfathering’) would, like in the US, be a 
crucial issue and probably heavily influenced by lobbyism, see Svendsen (1998). On 
the mix with other instruments the actors will prefer the use of negotiated agreements 
for cap setting and taxes are complimentary. On the compliance issue the actors will 
prefer none or only a small penalty and flexibility in the form of banking and carry 
over from the first period to the second thereby rewarding early action. 
 
The industrial producers are overall organised in UNICE (Union of Industrial and 
Employers’ Confederations of Europe) as well as the electricity generators are 
organised in Eurelectric. But the members in both organisations are very different and 
have there own specialised organisations. Therefore, it is legitimate to distinguish 
  7 among the members of Eurelectric and UNICE and their official opinion, which to a 
large degree is influenced by the largest members. The same situation is found in 
Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) representing the Oil and Gas industry, 
where Eurogas to a larger degree represents the distribution and EUROPIA represents 
the refineries. The electricity sector is divided into large producers, nuclear utilities, 
small CHP and DH, biomass and wind. We start with the electricity producers 
(Section 3.1) and then move on to the refining sector (Section 3.2), Iron and steel 
(Section 3.3), Paper and pulp (Section 3.4), Building materials (Section 3.5), and 
Chemistry (Section 3.6)  
 
 
3.1 Electricity producers 
We have chosen to differentiate between large and small producers of electricity 
because they are represented by different organisations in the EU and have diverging 
interests.  
 
3.1.1 Large producers 
 
They are mentioned as the main emitting sector and the most important sector for the 
program. Without the sector there would be no program. The opinion of the large 
producers is mainly represented by EURELECTRIC. Due to the important role of this 




EURELECTRIC is the association of the European Union Electricity Supply Industry. 
As noted by (Greenwood and Webster, 2000), liberalisation of public sector 
monopoly sectors, classically, disintegrates the unity of homogenous business interest 
associations, as the structure of members interests changes, typically resulting in the 
development of specialist niche associations. Hence, a response to liberalisation of the 
electricity sector in Europe was the creation of specialist sectors representing 
electricity traders, municipal producers, transmission and system operators, and 
renewable energy.  
  8  
Climate change mitigation is an area where the business interests of the Members of 
EURELECTRIC are very different. The opposing interests of the largest electricity 
producers in the EU become very apparent by comparing electricity production and 
CO2 emissions, which has been done in Figure 1 below. 
 


























































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Annual and Environmental Reports from individual companies, see Varming 
et al. (2000). 
 
As can be seen, there are large differences between companies with a high share of 
nuclear or hydro capacity and companies with a high share of production from fossil 
fuels. The mergers between more of the companies above in the last years have not 
decreased the difference. This clearly limits the ability of a lobbying organisation to 
influence on policies in this area. However, the organisation can gain some credibility 
in this policy area because of the lack of a clear-cut agenda.  
 
A main concern of EURELECTRIC is that the electricity sector will be required to 
reduce emissions much more than other sectors. With respect to CO2 emissions, the 
  9 electricity sector should be recognised as a sector that has already done a lot, and in 
the long term, electricity offers the possibility of minimal emissions.  
 
Concerning the four design issues in the Green Paper, Eurelectric proposes a 
voluntary cap and trade system where the target group should include as many sectors 
as possible. From 2005-2007 an opt-out possibility is preferable but the member states 
must determine commitments and regulation comparable to emissions trading. The 
inclusion of all 6 gases is preferable 
 
Second, the best method of allocation is grandfathering based on historical emissions. 
A national allocation of the amount of permits is necessary when taking the principle 
of subsidiarity into consideration. Further the program should reward early action. 
 
Third, emission trading is complementary and other instruments as taxes are more 
appropriate for small and mobile emitters.  It is necessary to link absolute and relative 
targets. Fourth, monitoring, reporting and verification should be harmonised on a 
community level but is the responsibility of the member states. Here, a penalty must 
be harmonised on a community level.  
 
In conclusion, the large electricity producers are winners on 3 subjects but a loser on, 
maybe the most important issues related to a voluntary or mandatory program. They 
won on grandfathering and the allocation of quantities by the member states. Reward 
for early action are laid in the hands of the national governments, who are to decide 
the use of carry over from the 1
st period to the 2
nd. The market would be more flexible 
if project based emissions where a part of the program but if the accession countries 
join the EU before the start of the program then a mandatory system could go hand in 
hand with investments in the new member states and turn the electricity sector into a 






  10 3.1.2 Nuclear 
 
The nuclear industry in Europe is organised in the European Atomic Forum 
(Foratom). Given that nuclear energy produces 35 % of Europe's electricity today 
(European Energy Outlook, 2000) and that the demand for electricity is projected to 
grow in the years to come, nuclear has to be part of the solution to climate change.  
 
Concerning the design issues, Foratom supports a mandatory system at the 
community level. It should work upstream including the whole chain from extraction 
to combustion in the power sector instead of the proposed downstream system. 
Foratom is very concerned that they would be unable to participate in the system and 
argue for an opt-in program open for all.     
 
Furthermore, Foratom fears that nuclear utilities owned by a large electricity producer 
are excluded and prefers allocation to entities and not only companies or sectors. The 
quantities should be regulated at community level and allocated with the same 
method.  Also, credit for early action must be included in the method of allocation. 
Benchmarking or auctioning will give the nuclear utilities a competitive advantage 
compared to other generators.  
 
Concerning potential mix with financial instruments such as green taxation, this 
option is rejected because it has a negative impact on competitiveness and raises the 
costs of meeting the emissions reductions targets. Finally, a EU-wide monitoring and 
reporting program for the nuclear sector and the EU is already existing and these 
experiences are most valuable in the EU GHG emission trade setting. 
 
In conclusion, nuclear power is an abatement sector and prefers a mandatory system 
but will still be a loser on the allocation issues. First the quantities allocated are 
decided by the member states and second the permits are given to companies by 
grandfathering and not entities by auctioning.  
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3.1.3 Small scale CHP 
 
CHP is represented by Cogen and Euroheat and Power (EHP) respectively. Cogen  
mainly represents industrial CHP and the producers of CHP technology, and Euroheat 
and Power represents public and municipal owned CHP and district heating (DH). 
Some of the members in Cogen and EHP use large amounts of biomass and EHP 
indirectly represent their interests as well.  The small CHP sector stand to lose in the 
liberalised energy markets because the environmental benefit from co-production is 
not supported.  
 
First, concerning the choice of target group, Cogen and EHP support the program 
starting in 2005. Without emission trading it is not possible to account for 
environmental benefit in combination with cross-border trade.  Also, Cogen and EHP 
agree with the proposal in the green paper, but combustion units lower than 50 MW 
should also be included. Otherwise a large number of new and existing plants will be 
excluded from the system. Cogen suggests that there should be no minimum limit at 
all. Cogen also wants to expand the system to Food and Drink, Airports and Public 
Buildings. Both interest groups support a community program without opting out and 
opting in possibilities.  
 
Second, about allocation the EHP wants the member states to decide the quantity 
allocated according to community guidelines whereas Cogen supports an allocation 
on community level. Both support the use of benchmarking because it rewards early 
action and efficient production methods. Auctioning is appropriate in the long term.  
 
Third, both interest groups think that a mix between taxes and emissions trading could 
make sense if the tax program is designed to benefit the environment and not 
government revenues. Fourth, the compliance issue must be solved by rules strongly 
harmonised at the community level.  
 
  12 In conclusion, the small CHP producers are winners. They wanted to be a part of the 
cap and trade program and succeeded. In the Green Paper they were mentioned as too 
small and too complicated to control and monitor. They partly lost on the choice of 
allocation method. They suggested auctioning and to a lesser degree benchmarking, 
which is a possibility. They still want extra attention and subsidising from the EU or 
national government, but it is unclear whether they can receive other kinds of national 
support. CEU are already planning a directive proposal to define and certify CHP 
production to be released in 2002. Further they wanted EU regulated monitoring and 
verification, which they did not get. If the accession countries are adopted in the EU, 
the CHP producers will lose and will argue for support on a national or EU-level.  
 
 
3.2 Refining   
 
The oil and gas industry is represented by the International Association of Gas and Oil 
Producers (OGP). The daughter organisation, EUROPIA, represents the refineries and 
is the author behind the answer.  
Clearly, given the ‘right’ implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, gas could be a major 
potential business opportunity for the gas industry.  The carbon intensity of gas is 
about half the size of coal and an increased share of natural gas use is needed to 
support the Kyoto targets. In this respect, the gas lobby is almost like an abatement 
lobby. 
 
Overall, the oil and gas lobby state in their replies that all sectors should on a 
voluntary basis be able to participate in emissions trading before 2008 and on a 
mandatory basis afterwards without the possibility to opt in and out. Not only 
refineries but also oil and gas producers in the EU and EEA should be included and 
GHG should be tradable.   
 
In their position to allocation they argue for free allocation and the inclusion of  both  
absolute and relative targets. There should be no ceiling on trade and the use of 
project-based reductions should not be restricted. Sinks and sequestration should be 
  13 allowed or at least considered. Concerning mix with other instruments, emissions 
trading should be seen as complimentary to other instruments and regulation. Finally, 
on the compliance issue, both lobbies argue that no penalty should be applied in a 
voluntary system. 
 
In conclusion, the oil and gas sector supports emissions trading and a dash for gas is 
foreseen. But the refinery sector has lost on two issues except allocation for free and 
complementarity to other instruments. It is in their interest to create a flexible and 
wide a market as possible to decrease the price for a permit. The emission from the 
sector might be relative small, but the consumption of gas is a target for public 
taxation. In the long run, the gas distributors stand to be winners. The inclusion of the 
project based reductions or the accession countries will only strengthen their position. 
The options for sequestration and storage in oil fields might open up for new 
opportunities and turn the sector into a large abatement actor. Finally, they are very 
eager to avoid any specific measures towards the problem with fugitive methane 




3.3 Steel and Iron 
 
European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries (EUROFER) represents 96% of 
the iron and steel industries in Europe. The answers from EUROFER are background 
for the description of the attitude to emissions trading in the steel industry. The last 
4% of the Iron and Steel industry is represented by European Independent Steelworks 
Association (IESA) and they are against any kind of emissions trading with the 
argument it will only distort instead of promote emissions reductions.  
 
The target group should be as wide as possible and contain not only industrial sectors. 
The steel lobby states that its producers are exposed to global competition and that 
emissions trading must not limit their future production. The iron and steel industry 
has always had a strong incentive to improve its energy efficiency and the potential 
for further improvements is limited. Steel and iron production is energy intensive and 
  14 ways to raise productivity and reduce the use of energy is the same as reducing costs. 
Second, relative targets should be set by benchmarking and negotiated agreements on 
a national level. Also, trading should be done at company and not at sector level. The 
program should include project-based mechanisms and thereby use the potential for 
transferring energy efficient processes. The allocation must take early actions and 
voluntary agreements into account. Third, emissions trading should replace traditional 
standard regulation. Fourth, global guidelines for measurement, monitoring, reporting 
and verification are needed.  
 
In conclusion, the iron and steel industry has lost. It was hoping for a voluntary 
program, the use of relative targets and project based reductions, but none of that is a 
part of the final proposal. The potentials for abatement through technological 
improvements are small and they are buyers of permits. Only by widening the 
program with other non-industrial sectors with higher abatement costs they might be 




3.4 Paper and pulp 
 
Confederation of European paper industry (CEPI) represents the pulp and paper 
industry in all of Europe. The position of CEPI is also supported by the Confederation 
of European Forrest Owners, CEPF.  
 
CEPI thinks that the target group should be as wide as possible and should also 
include the transport sector.  CEPI supports an early start in 2005 where opting out 
and starting with a few sectors might be necessary for acceptance. The allocation rule 
should be based on common guidelines on EU-level and most crucially through 
grandfathering based on a common baseline.  Target levels should be set by 
negotiation on a national level in accordance with national agreements. Also, the 
inclusion of sinks is important and no ceiling on trading and banking from early 
action should be allowed. Other instruments for CO2 mitigation are alternatives and 
therefore not simultaneously applicable measures. Compliance can be ensured by EU-
rules for monitoring, verification and control.  
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In conclusion, the pulp and paper industry has lost. The sector wanted a voluntary 
system, where targets are set by negotiation and compliance should on a community 
level. The inclusion of sinks would either bring them cheaper raw materials or give 




3.5  Building materials 
 
The cement industry is represented by CEMBUREAU and the ceramic industry by 
CERAMIE-UNIE. The answers from the ceramic sector are not very detailed and are 
to a large degree similar to the cement industry.  
 
Overall, they are in favour of an early but voluntary start of the program in 2005. The 
same sectors and companies should be covered in all member states. Opting in and 
out should not be allowed. It is important to look at the possibility for a baseline and 
credit program. In order to avoid distortions of competition a co-ordinated framework 
on EU-level is needed. Auctioning is not favourable because it is tantamount to a tax, 
though the ceramic industry is in favour of auctioning. Target levels should be set in 
national agreements and be in compliance with domestic policies and state aid 
guidelines. Concerning mix of instruments, it is probably not possible to combine 
taxes or regulatory standards with emissions trading. Rather, negotiated agreements 
could be the link between relative and absolute targets. Finally, there is no need for 
new EU-regulation to secure compliance. Monitoring and verification should be 
undertaken by the member states.  
 
In conclusion, the cement and ceramic industry has all in all lost in two out of four of 
the subjects. Again the industry is not in compliance with a mandatory and absolute 
target in a program starting in 2005, although they recognise that only a few sectors 
and them selves are a part of the program. Further they did not get their most 
preferred choice of allocation. 
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3.6  Chemistry 
 
The European Chemical Industry Council  (CEFIC) represents the chemical industry 
in Europe. It is the umbrella organisation for the national chemical federations and 
chemical companies in Europe. It represents more than 40.000 companies and a net 
turnover on ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 
 
The chemistry sector lobby does not want to be a part of a Community program. The 
industry stress that emissions trading will constraint their competitiveness and their 
ability to grow.  They are energy intensive and act on a global market and there are 
high risks of carbon leakage. The sector has already improved their efficiency through 
a Voluntary Energy Efficiency programme and further end of pipe abatement is not 
economically feasible. Allocation of reductions should only be made on a voluntary 
and national basis. The targets should be relative and based on energy efficiency or 
GHG intensity. These agreements should be negotiated with the trade associations. 
Permits should be allocated to companies and project reductions should be coupled 
with emissions trading. Thereby allowing a European or even global trading program 
and not only a national program. Also, it is important to reward early action. Emission 
trading is only one instrument among many other possibilities.  
 
In conclusion, compared to the final proposal, the chemical industry is not a part of 
the proposal and is regulated by national and voluntary and relative targets. Because 
the amount of producers is very large, they do not emit CO2 and it is too complex and 






  17 3 Conclusion 
Our main research question was whether the final GHG directive design proposal 
could be explained by potential industrial winners and losers involved in the policy 
making process.  
 
A first answer is ”no”, because almost all industrial sectors wanted a voluntary system 
and only the sectors not included in the system are winners.  According to the political 
economy the proposal must be amended before it can be accepted. Further the most 
conflictual issue of allocation and banking has been left to the national governments, 
and leaving an issue to the national governments is often the same as leaving the issue 
unanswered and open for negotiations. In general, EU has given more notice to the 
practical implementation of the system than to the requests from the lobby 
organisations.  
 
However, given that a emission trading system was to be established, we moved on to 
answer the main question by focusing on traditional industrial sectors and the energy 
sector. Our ‘first-round’ observation was that the chemistry sector avoided becoming 
a part of the final program and thereby the extra cost of having to undertake 
abatement efforts, see Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Winners and losers in final directive proposal. 
 
Winner   Loser 
Not part of 
the program  
1 subject  2 subjects  3 subjects  4 subjects 
Chemistry   Large electricity 
producers, nuclear  
Iron and steel, building 
materials, pulp and paper, 
refineries  
small scale CHP   None 
Source: The authors. 
 
However, the reason for excluding the chemistry sector was administrative rather than 
political. It did not pay to monitor and control the chemistry sector for administrative 
reasons because of its many small producers and the fact that they generally emitted 
all 6 GHG's.  
 
  18 Although the chemistry sector is described as a winner they might lose. The 
alternative is national taxes and standard regulation, which might be worse than 
emissions trading. However, emission target levels for the actors involved in permit 
trade may also be tightened in the future thus imposing extra and non-foreseen costs 
on polluters. Also, sectors outside the program will probable not be confronted with 
harder regulation, then the option for the sector to negotiate a more advantageous 
regulation on national level is better than on a an EU-level together with other large 
industrial sectors. If the CO2-price on the market should turn out to be less than the 
costs of national regulation, they can opt-in after 2008.  
 
Among the ‘first-round losers’, we move on to identify winners and losers within the 
program itself by comparing them to the projected CO2 price on 20-25 Euro/tonnes 
CO2 found in an EU sector study (Block, de Jager and Hendrics, 2001). Note how 
Table 2 showed that the large electricity producers and nuclear utilities were winners 
within the program as they lost in only one out of the four design issues. Followed by 
the industrial producers with 2 lost issues and CHP with 3 lost issues. When 
introducing CO2 permit trade, which political actors succeeded then in influencing the 
final design in a specific direction according to its hearing statements and the 
proposed directive? Table 3 reviews these results. 
 
Table 3: Potential sellers and buyers of permits. 
 
Sellers (winner)  Nuclear, large electricity producers,  
small scale CHP. 
Buyers (loser)  Refineries, iron and steel, building 
materials, pulp and paper,  
Source: The authors. 
 
By ‘sellers’ we mean sectors, which have access to cheap technical possibilities 
generally. It will generally pay them reduce emissions and sell permits in the market. 
In contrast, ‘buyers’ are those sectors that overall will have to buy permits in the 
market as they face more costly technical solutions for reducing their own emissions. 
As can be seen, the industry stands to be the buyer in general, whereas the large 
power producers and nuclear sector stand to be the potential sellers inside the 
program. Most prominently, we observed that grandfathering and free initial 
  19 allocation was chosen among a number of permit allocation rules. This choice 
favoured industry in general as it minimizes private reduction costs and creates a 
(financial) barrier to entry in relation to new market entrants which are forced to buy 
all their needed permits from existing firms. Thus, this design feature points in 
particular at the presence of strong industrial rent-seeking. A similar result can be 
found in the US where all tradable permit systems use grandfathering as permit 
allocation rule, see Svendsen (1998). 
  
The electricity sector is the largest and most important sector for the implementation 
of the program and the directive did therefore support their interests. The electricity 
sector has, as shown by Varming et al. (2000), numerous and cheap options for CO2 
reduction compared to other industrial sectors using fossil fuels for energy production. 
This argument is illustrated by the fact that industrial representatives such as UNICE 
and DG Enterprise were most active in lobbying and opposing the final directive 
proposal, which for this reason, was significantly delayed (ENDS, 2001). 
 
The general idea in this paper was that rent-seeking would affect the design of 
emission trading in favour of well-organized interest groups. How can we then 
explain that the large electricity producers became winners by being sellers and losing 
on one out of four subjects, whereas the other industrial sectors and small scale CHP 
became losers on two or three out of four subjects (see Table 2 above)?  
 
This empirical result fits the Olson (1965) theory of group size neatly. Because the 
large electricity producers form a small group, it is easier for them to lobby through 
EURELECTRIC than it is for the small firms in the losing fraction. In the case of the 
latter, the individual net gain from undertaking the collective good of non-
participation in this case will turn out negative for a small actor, see Svendsen (1998).  
Though the UNICE was supposed to represent the industrial losers as well, it dropped 
out because the big multinationals were no longer part of the system. The sectors then 
only had the voice of their own associations. The same is the case with the refineries, 
which where not directly supported by OPG but only through the smaller association 
of refineries (Europia).   
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In perspective, the opposing industrial sectors may be softened by giving them some 
kind of special rewards (or selective incentives) in the Olsonian sense (ibid.). One 
way would be to change the system from a cap and trade to a credit and baseline 
approach, where you are rewarded for reductions but not punished for exceeding your 
baseline. This system has been implemented in the UK and approved by the EU state 
aid guidelines. Another possibility would be a reduction in taxes but it requires that 
the actors were imposed to taxes before the start of the program. This kind of program 
is suggested in France. A last but least desirable method to implement a mandatory 
system would be to make the targets relative, thereby not limiting the possibilities for 
growth. German industry and large electricity generators support this solution. We 
have not mentioned the position of the national governments but they will to a large 
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